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Chapter One: Social Media, Public Sphere and Democracy 
 
Introduction 
 
This chapter provides working definitions of the terms ‘network society’, ‘digital democracy’ 
and ‘mediated citizenship’ and takes a critical stance as to whether these have shifted social 
dynamics. In the academic writing about democracy, especially in regard to the media, a 
collective ambivalence emerges, with some writers expressing more optimism, and other 
taking a dimmer view. The questions about democracy become still more complex not least 
as modes of citizenship evolve; the gradual shift to what is often dubbed ‘mediated 
citizenship’ raises various issues, alongside with positive and negative forecasts. The chapter 
explores the literature and academic debates concerning socio-politics of the social media, 
with particular emphasis on the political value of Web 2.0 technologies. The exercise and 
devolution of power is also analysed in regard to the vertical communication between citizens 
and government (for example, with their representatives or agencies). Some such efforts in 
‘electronic governance’ are laudable and facilitate democratic communication. However, 
other easily fall prey to a power stance that blocks communication. Recent treatments of 
power specifically in relation to media have been offered, among others, by Coleman and 
Blumler (2009), who argue that democracy fails to engender relationships of accountability 
and advocate an online media commons as a policy direction to enhance the democratic 
character of cyberspace’s role in the public sphere, a direction similar to the calls for a public 
service media model in the online world (see, for example, Iosifidis 2010).  
 The work also addresses related issues such as ‘reformulated participation’, ‘consumption’, 
and ‘prosumerism’ and asks whether these lead to new politics and the reduced role of the 
state and the increasing empowerment of citizens in the era of electronic governance. A vital 
issue to be discussed is whether democracy is in serious trouble or not and to assess this 
much credence will be given to sceptics such as Putnam (1995, 2000) and Morozov (2012). 
Putnam has expressed concerns that a democratic deficit has occurred with regard to a 
collapse in virtue and citizenship and this has led to a profound ‘thinning’ of the political 
community and the formation of the atomised citizen who is ‘bowling alone’. He has argued 
that new forms of social capital are necessary to reconnect citizens with their societies. There 
is also consideration to the factors that are conducive to citizen engagement and an inclusive 
public sphere and in this context the chapter refers to Evgeny Morozov’s Net Delusion. In his 
volume, Morozov contends that the Internet is a tool that both revolutionises and 
authoritarian governments can use, so in the latter cases social media sites have been used to 
entrench dictators and threaten dissidents, making it harder to promote democracy. John 
Keane’s cautious view with regards to social media and the public sphere will be explored, as 
will Henrik Bang’s theory of Everyday Makers with relation to political participation in late 
modernity.
i
 There will also be consideration of the counter arguments, such as Pippa Norris’s 
thesis that democratic engagement has been reinvented for modern times, rather than simply 
atrophied. We look at the social media and democracy with a normative eye but also 
empirically, so throughout our book we list a number of examples and cases to validate 
theoretical points, such as the Arab uprisings and the recent revelations of the extent of US 
government surveillance of its own citizens and abroad. 
 
The Traditional Public Sphere and the Mass Media 
 The Traditional Paradigm: the Public Sphere and the media as ‘Fourth Estate’ 
 
In modern democracies there are typically three branches of government: the legislative 
branch to make the laws, the executive branch to enforce the laws, and the judicial branch to 
interpret the laws. However, the rise of mass media enabled the development of another 
independent institution: the ‘Fourth Estate’, which is central to pluralist democratic 
processes. The view that the Press is the fourth branch of government (or fourth estate) is 
based on the assumption that the media’s role is to act as a watchdog on the actions of 
government. Liberal theorists contend that the existence of an independent press is essential 
in the process of democratisation and the right of freedom of expression, by strengthening the 
responsiveness and accountability of governments to all citizens, and providing a pluralist 
platform and channel of political expression for a multiplicity of groups and interests (Sen, 
1999). Under this prism the media is called the fourth branch of the government because it 
plays a crucial ‘checking function’ role in the fortunes of political candidates by ensuring that 
elected representatives uphold their oaths of office and carry out the wishes of the electorate. 
In this regard, the media acts as the custodian of the ‘public interest’, which refers, among 
others, to the widening of public access to mass media, which in turn promotes democracy 
and freedom of expression. The growing access to modern technologies such as landline 
telephones, the printed press, broadcast media, and the new social media, laid the basis for an 
informed citizenry able to participate effectively in political affairs.  
 
A definition of the term 'public communication', with reference to the mass media, has been 
suggested by Ferguson (1986: ix) as 'those processes of information and cultural exchange 
between media institutions, products and publics which are socially shared, widely available 
and communal in character'. The context in which these transactions take place is the so-
called 'public sphere' - that is, as articulated in particular by political theorist Habermas (1989 
[1962]), a space for rational and universalistic politics distinct from both the state and the 
economy, a scene of activity in which people are addressed as citizens, as rational political 
beings, and not merely as consumers. The concept of the public sphere is a central analytical 
tool to help us make sense of the relationship between the media and democracy (civic 
engagement). Habermas explained that in the late eighteenth century a new political class (the 
bourgeoisie) came to the fore in Britain in particular and formed a public body which, in 
sharp contrast to the old authorities, notably the state and the church, provided the conditions 
for reason-based, public opinion. The creation of a network of institutions by the bourgeoisie 
within the civil society, and the launch of a number of newspapers more specifically, 
provided the means through which private thoughts could become public. Libraries and 
universities became the places for public debate, while publishing enterprises formed the 
means by which government was criticized. That new public sphere was in principle open to 
all and was protected from the power of both the church and the state.  
 
The decline of the traditional public sphere 
 
However, Habermas pointed out that this space for rational and universalistic politics created 
by the capitalist market was historically damaged by both the extension of the state and the 
evolution of monopoly capitalism. The formation of large private institutions (advertising 
agencies, public relations) and the deals they made with each other and with the state while 
excluding the public, led to the replacement of rational public discourse by power politics. 
The role of the media was central to the replacement of the ideal speech situation by 
conditions of 'distorted communication'. Whereas the independent press at the turn of the 
nineteenth century had led to the formation of rational public debate and public decision-
making on political and judicial matters, it later functioned as a manipulative agency 
controlling public opinion. The media’s role in the public debate shifted from the 
dissemination of rational and independent information to the formation of public opinion. 
Following the changing communications ecology, the public sphere is discovered as a 
platform for advertising and public relations. Control of the news media is used to reinforce 
the power of autocratic regimes and to deter criticism of the government by independent 
journalists, though official government censorship, state ownership of the main radio and 
television channels, legal restrictions on freedom of expression and publication (such as 
stringent libel laws and restrictive official secrets acts), limited competition through 
oligopolies in commercial ownership, and the use of outright violence and intimidation 
against journalists and broadcasters (Sussman, 2001). As will be shown below, the Internet 
can be used either way: to empower citizens and enhance the public sphere, or as a means of 
manipulation and control. 
 
The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere – The Fifth Estate 
 
The debates surrounding the idea of the public sphere have taken a renewed interest with the 
emergence of the Internet and other new online media and social networks
ii
 which can 
provide new communication spaces where debate can be conducted. It is worth emphasising 
from the outset that this material is really at the centre of the study and will shape our 
approach and analysis of the social media. While Habermas’ original work published well 
before the digital revolution, computer-mediated communication has taken the place of 
coffeehouse discourse (Boeder, 2005). The diffusion of the Internet, first deployed in 1969, 
but also mobile communication, digital media and a wide range of tools of social software 
have prompted the development of interactive communication (Castells, 2007: 246). As was 
previously the case with radio, television and the printed media, the Internet terrain has 
produced new spaces for information, debate and participation – as well as new possibilities 
for manipulation and social control. But as Curran, Fenton and Freedman (2012) argued we 
need to understand the Internet in its social, economic and political context and avoid a 
technologically deterministic view. While the rise of traditional news media such as the press, 
radio and television enabled the development of the fourth state (take, for example, the 
investigative coverage by the Washington Post, Time and The New York Times of the 
Watergate political scandal in the US in the 1970s)
iii
, the growing use of the Internet and 
related digital technologies is creating a space for networking individuals in ways that, 
according to Dutton (2009) enable a new source of accountability in government, politics and 
other sectors. Dutton explains how this emerging ‘Fifth Estate’ is being established and why 
this could challenge the influence of other more established bases of institutional authority. 
The author discusses approaches to the governance of this new social and political 
phenomenon that could nurture the Fifth Estate’s potential for supporting the vitality of 
liberal democratic societies.  
 
The new mantra of media terminology is already characterized by terms such as ‘electronic 
commons’, ‘virtual democracy’, ‘electronic agora’, ‘blogosphere’, ‘twitter-sphere’, and so on. 
These online forums or social spaces of the Web 2.0 (a nascent movement towards a more 
interactive and collaborative web as it provides a platform for online social participation in 
communities of interest) differ substantially from the traditional ones such as that of public 
service broadcasting in a number of ways: first, they attract many more people than 
traditional media. In 2015, nearly 740 million people logged into Facebook daily, 48 per cent 
of its 1.4 billion users (see Chapter 2 for more statistics). Twitter and Google+, with roughly 
600 million users each, get more and more activity every day. These numbers are out of reach 
for traditional media such as radio and television stations. In fact, if Facebook were a country 
it would now be equally populous to China and/or India, the largest countries on earth in 
terms of population. But it is not only numbers/scale that matters, for social networks allow 
more interactivity and many-to-many communication on a global scale, rather than one-to-
many as it is the case with traditional broadcast media. The democratic potential of the 
Internet can be realised through the ever larger quantity of debate that can take place in there 
compared to the limited capacity of traditional media that are confined within national 
borders.  
 
The globalisation of the public sphere 
 
In this context, the emergence of the Internet and social media calls for a globalisation of the 
public sphere and public opinion. The space for public discourse and the formation of public 
opinion increasingly take place at a transnational context that crosses national boundaries. 
Whereas the traditional media in the form of the newspaper press and public television have 
been an integral part in the creation of a national public sphere, there is a widespread 
assumption that new spheres of communication networks can provide the basis for shared 
concerns, common tastes, political and cultural turns at a global level. In fact, citizens are 
taking to the streets in cities across the world to demand greater accountability from their 
leaders in a surge not seen since the end of World War I. The issues differ from country to 
country - against austerity measures, violations of privacy, exploitation of the environment or 
the abuse of electronic surveillance - but they all demonstrate a quest for good governance 
and the power of the new digital and social media. These citizen uprisings represent a new 
force on the world stage that serves as a counterweight to the excesses of the current political 
order, whether democratic or authoritarian. As the news media have long played an essential 
role as watchdog over government, a ‘fourth estate’ that guards against abuse of power, 
today's exposures of the surveillance activities of the US National Security Agency, or police 
brutality in the case of Taksim Square demonstrations in Turkey in June 2013, show the 
ability of new social media to shed light on the workings of government and provide a public 
forum for the debate of laws and policies.  
 
As the new media disrupt the industrial model of information, citizens now have the power to 
oversee the actions of their elective representatives, thereby enabling a more direct form of 
democracy to emerge. The availability of information via social media like Facebook and 
Twitter, and the rise of user-generated content such as personal blogs have enhanced citizens’ 
ability to communicate and self-organise. The emerging ‘citizens movement’, or to copy 
Castells (2012) the ‘social movements in the Internet age’ is a worldwide phenomenon and 
serves as a check and balance on the prerogatives of government. Millions of citizens have 
taken to the streets of Sao Paulo, Tel Aviv, Manila, Madrid and Bangkok demanding good 
governance and an end to corruption. Demonstrators have swept away autocratic 
governments in many Arab countries such as Tunisia, Egypt and Libya. Citizens in Southern 
Europe call for an end of austerity measures that lead to economic exploitation and hopeless 
poverty. India demand protection from rape. In China tens of millions of bloggers have 
become a virtual citizens lobby pushing for environmental change, blocking huge new dams 
and petrochemical plants. It is fair to say then that the new social media enhance traditional 
journalism in defending the public trust. Citizen journalists have expanded the reach and the 
scope of established mass media outlets like the BBC and Al Jazeera and have brought a 
greater degree of transparency to governments than has ever existed before. Now that access 
to a mobile phone, news reports, pictures and opinions are almost universally available 
people have become empowered to demand accountability from their governments. As 
Hoffman (2013) put it, ‘citizens are the new Fourth Estate’. There are certainly risks that 
these newly empowered citizens could become pawns for populist demagogues, but this is far 
more likely to happen when the media are controlled by a few than when there are multiple 
and independent sources of information (ibid.). 
 
In today’s network society, power is multidimensional and is organised around digital, 
interactive and self-expanding networks whose participants have very diverse interests and 
values. In direct contrast to power relations that are embedded in the institutions of society, 
especially the state, social movements exercise counter-power by constructing themselves 
initially through a process of autonomous communication, free from the control of those 
holding institutional power. As Castells (2012: 9) argues, ‘because mass media are largely 
controlled by governments and media corporations, in the network society communicative 
autonomy is primarily constructed in the Internet networks and in the platforms of wireless 
communication’. These social networks carve out a new public space for deliberation, distinct 
from the constitutionally designated space which is occupied by the dominant political and 
economic elites. But are these new media enhancing democracy and contributing to political 
participation? 
 
The democratization of the public sphere 
 
A democratic social system can be defined as a system in which the supreme power is vested 
in the people and exercised by them directly or indirectly through a system of representation 
typically involving periodically held free elections. The origins of democracy can be traced in 
Athens about 2,500 years ago. In the 6
th
 century BC the ‘Ancient Agora’ was the centre of 
public life in Athens and this place can also be considered as the centre of democracy as 
Athenian citizens were gathering to listen to speeches by philosophers in the likes of 
Demosthenes, Plato and Socrates. The Ancient Agora was a place of direct democracy as 
people were taking important political decisions and were voting by raising their hand. 
Nowadays, most democracies around the world are representative ones as people usually 
choose their leaders to represent them through general elections. However, the Internet seems 
to challenge this as it offers a powerful means for citizen direct involvement in public life and 
politics. It satisfies the need for a new form of democracy, a type of post-electoral democracy 
whose spirit and institutions were infused with a commitment to casting out the devils of 
arbitrary, publicly unaccountable power. 
   
The Internet’s democratic potential has been highlighted in such works as Rheingold (1993) 
and Kellner (1997), whose central thesis is that cyberspace provides an ideal basis for 
transnational dialogical exchanges. Another optimistic view is that the Internet tends to 
democratize access to information and undermine hierarchies. For example, De Sola Pool 
(1983) viewed computer-based communication networks like the Internet as inherently 
democratic ‘technologies of freedom’. In response to this freedom versus control debate, 
Danziger et al (1982) noted that the Internet can support and reinforce many different forms 
of networks. These connect in the traditional one-to–many pattern of the mass media, but in 
the new world also one-to-one, many-to-one, many-to-many, and so on. Therefore, the 
Internet can be shaped by developers, users, and regulators to support the ‘communicative 
power’ of both institutions and individuals in many ways.  
 
The Internet can facilitate the spread of debate and deliberation across many parts of the 
population that may be spatially dispersed. In this sense, the democratic potential of the 
Internet can be realized through the ever larger quantity of rational critical debate that can 
take place in there compared to the limited capacity of traditional media that are confined 
within national borders. Viewed this way, the emergence of the Internet (and other new 
online and international media) calls for a globalization of the public sphere and public 
opinion. The space for public discourse and the formation of public opinion increasingly take 
place at a transnational context that crosses national boundaries. It has been put forward that 
new technologies have allowed the formation of a transnational or global public sphere as a 
forum for political discussion. While the traditional media in the form of the newspaper press 
and public television have been an integral part in the creation of a national public sphere, 
there is a widespread assumption that new spheres of communication networks can provide 
the basis for shared concerns, common tastes, political and cultural turns at a global level. 
The power of media is increasing with the spread of 24-hour cable news networks, the 
Internet, the seeming omnipresence of personal audio and video devices, and the social 
networking sites, so the influence of the media on enhancing public dialogue and political 
debate - the so-called ‘political socialization’ - has become ubiquitous. But has it? 
 
Democratic Deficit: Putnam’s concept of social capital 
 
There have been growing concerns that a ‘democratic deficit’ has occurred with regard to a 
collapse in virtue and citizenship. The concept of a democratic deficit or a democratic gap is 
the idea that the governance in a country or region in some ways lacks democratic legitimacy. 
This has led to a profound ‘thinning’ of the political community and the formation of the 
atomised citizen who is ‘bowling alone’ (Putnam, 1995). US scholar Robert Putnam 
considered the theory of the social capital as a governance mechanism that provides 
‘closeness’ and ‘trustworthiness’ among people. Putnam’s thesis needs to incorporate his 
definition of social capital and therefore take account of both structural and cultural 
dimensions of social capital simultaneously, that is, the strength of social networks (measured 
in terms of belonging to a wide range of associational groups and social movements), and the 
cultural norms (measured by feelings of social trust). By ‘social capital’, the author referred 
to features of social life - networks, norms and trust – that enable participants to act together 
more effectively to pursue shared objectives (Putnam, 1996). Coleman (1988: 96) defined 
social capital according to its function. It is not a single entity, but a variety of different 
entities, with two elements in common: they all consist of some aspect of social structures, 
and they facilitate certain actions by actors (individuals or corporate) within that structure.  
 
A similar definition has been provided by Bourdieu and Wacquant (1992: 119) who said that 
social capital is ‘the sum of the resources, actual or virtual, that accrue to an individual or a 
group by virtue of possessing a durable network of more or less institutionalised relationships 
of mutual acquaintance and recognition’. Social capital then is composed of a network, a 
cluster of norms, values and expectations that are shared by members of a group (Halpern, 
2005). To return to Putnam, he argued that new forms of social capital are necessary to 
reconnect citizens with their societies (Putnam, 2000). The fears of inequality have been 
heightened by the decline of civic virtues, the dismantlement of democratic associations and 
the disengagement of public with the political classes. Putnam noticed that communication 
agreements upon what constitutes the common good have dissolved as trust has been eroded. 
To fill the accompanying void, Putnam called for the extension of voluntary organisations to 
create ‘virtuous circles’ to accumulate social capital so that enable citizens may agree on a set 
of shared aims for collective activity (Putnam, 2000). Shing and Chung (2011) though seem 
to put their faith on the new technology to encourage citizens’ participation and contribution 
to the public sphere. With the current technological advances like the use of Web 2.0 media, 
the authors argue, online social network platforms could promote civic engagement that 
allows for bridging of social capital across geographical, organizational, hierarchical, 
temporal and spatial barriers. 
 
The argument that citizen engagement and contribution within the public sphere is in doubt 
can be seen if one considers the case of the European Union (EU), where it is said to exist a 
democratic deficit. The term was initially used to challenge the transfer of legislative powers 
from national governments to the Council of Ministers of the EU and it is most used in 
traditionally ‘Eurosceptic’ countries such as the UK. A growing number of politicians and 
academics propose that there is a political communication deficit in the EU that leads to the 
following long-term consequences: apathy, political ignorance and the alarming 
dissatisfaction of European citizens with politics in Europe. Kaitatzi-Whitlock (2005) 
investigated the relationship between political communication, politics and policymaking in 
the EU over a twenty year period and correlated the political communication deficit with the 
communication strategies and policies that have been pursued by the EU ever since the early 
1980s and have resulted in de-politicization and the diminishing of the EU’s legitimacy as a 
supranational political entity. The author argued that European citizens have been deprived of 
their most fundamental rights and needs for political information as well as the means for 
political participation, despite the empowering possibilities offered today by technology. The 
Euro crisis has worsened the problem and affected negatively political apathy. This is 
justified by the low European Parliament election turnout in May 2014 at around 43 per cent, 
matching the 2009 election turnout, but well below the 1979 European Parliament election 
(62 per cent) or even the 1994 election (57 per cent). 
 
Pippa Norris is among the commentators that go against the arguments raising concerns about 
citizen disengagement from the traditional channels of political participation, anti-party 
sentiment and the decay of civil organisations. In her trilogy considering related facets of 
these phenomena, the author stated that these concerns are not justified. The first volume, 
Virtuous Circle (Norris, 2000), developed a critique of the mass media malaise thesis, 
demonstrating that attention to the news media was positively, not negatively, linked to civic 
engagement. The second, Digital Divide (Norris, 2001), explored the potential of the Internet 
for civic engagement, and the way that new opportunities online altered the resources for 
political competition, facilitating a more level playing field for smaller challengers and 
opposition movements with technical skills and know-how.  Building upon this foundation, 
the third volume of this trilogy, Democratic Phoenix (Norris, 2002), compares systematic 
evidence for electoral turnout, party membership and civic activism in countries around the 
world and suggests good reasons to question popular assumptions of pervasive decline. It is 
stated that multiple forms of civic engagement have emerged in modern societies to 
supplement traditional modes of political activism and that political participation appears to 
have evolved and diversified over the years, in terms of the agencies (collective 
organisations), repertoires (the actions commonly used for political expression), and targets 
(the political actors that participants seek to influence). The process of societal modernisation 
and rising levels of human capital are primarily responsible for driving these developments, 
although patterns of participation are also explained by the structure of the state, the role of 
mobilising agencies, and social inequalities in resources and attitudes. As a result, according 
to Norris, democratic engagement has been reinvented for modern times, rather than simply 
atrophied. It can be seen then that there are mixed finding regarding the presumed declining 
confidence among the citizens in the formal political system’s capacity to deal with 
contemporary issues.  
 Social media and the public sphere: John Keane’s cautious view 
 
Much has been written about the democratizing and empowering implication of the Internet 
and the new social media and much of it can be dubbed as idealistic and representing 
technological determinism (see Nieminen, 2009: 40). Not surprisingly, the attempt to ground 
theoretically and empirically the ‘ideal speech situation’ - at least as formulated by Habermas 
- on the web has been met with scepticism. Coleman (1999) suggests that much online 
discussion in characterized as bad-tempered, perhaps as a result of the decline in public 
debate in physical spaces such as open meetings and street corners, where people first learnt 
to argue effectively. Wilhelm (1999) also refers to the dangers of poor dialogue and a skewed 
distribution of contributors in cyberspace. As Boeder (2005) argues, it is often the case that 
major decisions and actions concerning transnational matters occur without intense public 
attention. This section attempts to identify the basic contours of how the notion of the public 
sphere is taking shape in the realm of social media and for this purpose will refer to John 
Keane’s work of monitoring democracy. 
 
According to Keane (2008), strong caution is counselled in the face of such utopian 
extravagance, not least because the new age of communicative abundance is unstable, even 
self-contradictory, for instance in the widening power gaps between the communication rich 
and poor, who seem almost unneeded as communicators or consumers. His claim is that our 
world is now living through an historic sea change, one that is taking us away from the old 
world of representative democracy towards a form of democracy with entirely different 
contours and dynamics, workings and political implications, namely monitory democracy. 
Keane (2008) argues that the growth of monitory democracy is tied closely to the growth of 
media-saturated societies – societies in which all institutions operate within fields of media 
defined by ‘communicative abundance’. This monitory democracy and its powerful 
mechanisms of handling and moderating conflict should take into account the mediation of 
power and conflict by the institutions of communication. In the age of monitory democracy, 
the old utopia of shedding light on power - pushing, for instance, towards ‘freedom of 
information’ and ‘government in the sunshine’ and greater ‘transparency’ - strongly 
motivates journalists, citizens, lawyers, judges, NGOs and others (ibid.).  
 
Thus monitory democracy has been helped by the end of the age of scarcity and the 
emergence of communicative abundance (and the wide availability of computerised media 
networks). Citizens nowadays have in their discretion multiple means to scrutinise, complain 
about and resist their governments, not just through parliaments, but also through watchdogs, 
audits, local assemblies, civil society monitors and so on. Keane’s central example of 
monitoring democracy in action is India, as this vast emerging country has a distinctive 
combination of almost limitless political variety. One could also argue that other countries 
like Britain lived through a monitory democratic moment in 2011-13 as the expenses scandal 
(in which public figures were claiming money for personal expenses like mortgages and 
swimming pools) showed how much harder it has become for politicians to keep things 
hidden. Silvio Berlusconi’s government in Italy also went down following sex scandals made 
known by the new social media. As a commentator (Runciman, 2009) put it, monitoring 
democracy is an essentially negative idea of politics – it is, as Keane argues, the idea of a 
politics in which ‘nobody should rule’. As such, it is only a partial description of what 
democracy is and what it needs to be.   
 
The Internet’s contribution to politics: Bang’s theory 
 The Internet’s contribution to politics is evidenced by the fact that since the mid-1990s most 
general elections in democratic countries have had official websites, whilst the main political 
parties across the globe are trying to improve their online activities. Pippa Norris’s 
comparative analysis, listed above, also provides evidence of democratic engagement and 
growing political participation in the modern era. Yet, can the Internet and social media 
undermine democratic institutions and erode traditional institutions of representative, 
deliberative democracy by providing the means for citizens to participate directly in public 
policy-making? To answer this question we refer to Bang’s concept of Everyday Makers.  
 
Bang argues that the nature of politics and political participation have changed in the era of 
late modernity.
iv
 In his view, there are tensions between engagement norms and duty norms. 
This distinction revolves around, on the one hand, whether people get involved out of a sense 
of duty or because they want to engage to make a difference, and on the other, between 
having a project identity and a legitimating or oppositional one. For Bang, people have 
engagement norms and a project identity, rather than duty norms and a legitimating and/or 
oppositional identity. In his view, citizens have reacted to the increased change and 
complexity associated with late modernity in innovative ways: they have engagement norms 
and a project identity, so they are certainly not apathetic, but they reject duty norms and do 
not have a legitimating (or indeed oppositional) identity. Rather, they are increasingly 
reflexive, drawing on their own experience and engaging on their own terms. Some have 
become what he terms Expert Citizens, who use their skills to speak on behalf of, rather than 
listening to, ordinary citizens. In many ways, the emergence of the Everyday Maker is a 
response to the Expert Citizen (see Marsh and Vromen, 2013).  
  
Bang identifies five key characteristics of Everyday Makers: a. their participation is ad hoc, 
cause specific and part-time, and thus not driven by organisational membership; b. Everyday 
Makers have minimal interest in party-based and organised politics and stay away from state-
based participation, such as consultation exercises, thereby distinguishing themselves from 
Expert Citizens who operate in partnership and collaboration with the state; c. Everyday 
Makers’ participation is grounded in their lived experiences and thus is immediate and local, 
certainly non-ideological, but driven by a project identity; d. they are not interested in idea-
driven social and political change, but rather in an issue or cause-driven projects; e. finally, 
they are involved in politics for fun and to express themselves. For this reason, creative forms 
of action, expression and multimedia use are often at the core of participation for Everyday 
Makers.  
 
Marsh and Vromen (2013) viewed the concept of Everyday Makers as one of the most 
interesting developments in recent conceptual work on political participation, but they looked 
critically at it, drawing on a series of empirical examples. In their view, it should be 
acknowledged that there are many participating citizens who demonstrate some, but not all, 
of the characteristics of Everyday Makers. While Bangs does not discuss variations between 
Everyday Makers along this dimension, Marsh and Vromen think these to be very important 
and, as such, there is a need either to distinguish between different types of Everyday Makers, 
or, alternatively, to recognise that we need more categories. Marsh and Vromen illustrate this 
point by applying Bang’s model to six contemporary case studies of participation, three from 
the UK (Marsh, O’Toole and Jones’ work on young people and politics in Birmingham; 
Taylor’s study of feminist activists in Manchester; and the case of UK Uncut), one 
transnational (Halupka’s research on Anonymous), and two from Australia (Vromen and 
Coleman’s work on GetUp in Australia; Jackson and Chen’s research on Occupy Sydney). 
Furlong and Cartmel (2012) appear to share their view by referring to the UK case, and in 
particular to the social change and political engagement among young peoples in 2009/2010. 
 
The public interest and media governance 
 
The regulatory issues associated with the social media will be examined in detail in Chapter 
Three, which identifies the key policy variables within national governments (UK and the 
USA), and at a supranational level in the European Union. Here, it suffices to note that the 
articulation of a public interest framework in a regime of social media governance has to take 
into account both traditional concerns (such as access, media plurality and freedom of 
expression) and new emerging concerns. These include: privacy and intellectual property 
rights; transparency about data processing; protection of users from harmful content 
(violence, sexually explicit content, hate speech and harassment). Some of these concerns 
have been with us for some time, but specific points of focus in the Internet era include issues 
of access to (and usage of) user data by social media platforms typically for advertising and 
marketing purposes and/or insurance companies. Content ownership, especially the 
application of copyright laws to the practices in which social media facilitate the production 
and dissemination of user-generated content, may also integrate copyright material. 
Protection of minors has always been high in the agenda of regulators, but this issue has 
gained renewed interest in the online world with an attempt to define enhanced safeguards for 
user data, the vulnerability of minors to sexual predators, their exposure to hate speech, as 
well as online bullying.     
 
So, what can be done to protect ourselves from the above? Most countries have adapted 
content regulation (especially negative content regulation - restricting diffusion of certain 
types of information, text, sound and images, imposing advertising restrictions) and have 
expanded it to cover the online world. However, the restriction or suppressing of harmful, 
politically or socially undesirable content is at odds with the principle of freedom of speech 
in democratic societies and therefore it is not a straightforward task for contemporary policy 
to apply content rules. Also, the principle of liberal democracies’ non-interventionist 
approach in communications is incompatible with imposing negative media content policies. 
Given this, it has been put forth that the online digital era brings with it an increased 
responsibility to the individual media users and that social media platforms should enable 
individual responsibility and autonomy. Commentators such as Singer (2014) claim that users 
should now play a more predominant role in social media governance as they are increasingly 
involved in the production and dissemination of online content through their functions as 
citizen journalists. Certainly, the public is to bear more responsibility and indeed to be more 
accountable in using the Internet and social media. At the same time, social media platforms 
need to comply with acceptable levels of transparency, accountability that have been set by 
governments or international bodies, for the presence of these is crucial if the public is to bear 
more responsibility and indeed to be more accountable in using the Internet and social media. 
The complex issue of whether citizens can actually become custodians of the emergent model 
of the public interest is elaborated further in Chapter Three. 
 
Social Media and Democracy  
 
The key question to address here is whether social media contribute to democracy, revolution 
and expansion of the public sphere, or whether social media are first and foremost 
instruments of control and commerce. To answer the above question this section engages 
with social media sceptics and discusses various concerns that have arisen regarding the 
contribution of electronic networks to democracy. 
 
Unstructured participation 
 
First, the open participation of the Internet and social media can turn chaotic in which there 
might be no model rules of behaviour, thereby allowing no structured conversation. Gladwell 
(2010) stressed that successful activism requires strategic hierarchies, with a careful and 
precise allocation of tasks. In contrast, social media create loose and essentially leaderless 
networks, not capable of organising revolutions. As networks typically do not have a 
centralised leadership structure and clear lines of authority, they cannot reach consensus and 
cannot set strategic goals. A relevant issue is that social sites also have the tendency to 
distract people from important issues. Morozov (2012) believes that few people use the 
Internet and social media for political activism, whereas huge numbers view in there 
pornography, play games, watch movies, or share pictures. These trivial uses of the Internet 
and social media are well known in the West and they are now spreading in authoritarian 
regimes. Furthermore, Morozov notes the danger that the sheer volume of information 
available through social media - coupled with its increased general availability via the 
Internet and 24/7 news cycles - creates shorter attention spans in which important news is 
quickly supplanted by new developments elsewhere. For example, the ‘Twitterverse’ flocked 
to read and retweet news of the ultimately unsuccessful Iranian uprising of June 2009. Yet the 
story was swiftly cast aside upon the death of pop megastar Michael Jackson. While social 
media may create quicker and louder conversations, those conversations may tend to be 
shallow, short, and easily displaced by the newest ‘big thing’ (Joseph, 2012). 
 
Unreliable information 
 
A related issue is that a good deal of the Internet’s content is unreliable. As a widespread 
source of information the Internet should provide reliable, authentic and up-to-date 
information, but user generated content and blogs, in particular, are often defined as 
unreliable sources, containing personal and one-sided opinions. It is fair to say that common 
sense (house rules) and common decency should be the rule, or acceptable practice, when 
posting materials on the Internet, but as this is largely a self-regulated area, reaction comes 
only when someone complains. There is clearly a need for a better balance enforcing 
appropriate online behaviour, the assignment of liability, and protecting freedom of speech. 
Frankly providing an informed (and safe) online experience is important both for users and 
businesses. Dahlberg (2007) has found that the online debate is polarised and there is 
generally a lack of listening to others. He pointed out that the Internet and social media fail to 
adequately consider the asymmetries of power through which deliberation and consensus are 
achieved, the inter-subjective basis of meaning, the centrality of respect for difference in 
democracy, and the democratic role of ‘like-minded’ deliberative groups. What is often 
absent in online deliberations is a consensus-based, justified and rational decision, let alone 
that not everyone affected by that decision is included. But it is fair to say that very little of 
online content is legally actionable, and an even smaller proportion is actually subject to any 
kind of legal action. Exceptions to this are cases like the famous Sally Bercow tweet case that 
took place in the UK. In November 2012 Bercow used her Twitter account to hint the name 
of Lord McAlpine, a Conservative peer, alleged by the BBC to be a paedophile. The 
allegations proved to be unfounded, and the peer took legal action against Bercow and others. 
In May 2013, the High Court found that Sally Bercow's tweet 'was libellous' and Bercow 
agreed to pay damages. However, most content that people are publishing is not defamatory. 
At a European Union level, the eCommerce Directive (EU, 2002) establishes clear rules and 
protections that online retailers and service providers must comply with when dealing with 
consumers in the member countries of the EU, covering platforms that are allowing other 
people to publish user generated content. 
 
Censorship 
 
Third, censorship might be an issue. The extent of Internet censorship varies on a country-to-
country basis. While most democratic countries have moderate Internet censorship, other 
countries go as far as to limit the access of information such as news and suppress discussion 
among citizens. In countries like China, North Korea and Cuba the respective governments 
restrict their citizens’ Internet access by blocking specific websites. Amnesty International, a 
non-governmental organisation dealing with human rights, notes that China has the largest 
recorded number of imprisoned journalists and cyber-dissidents in the world. Facebook, 
Twitter and YouTube are all explicitly blocked in China, while in March 2010 Google 
withdrew from China owing to an ever stronger censorship of its searches. Domestic Chinese 
equivalents of these sites, such as Baidu, Taobao, Renren and QQ have been launched, that 
can be more readily controlled by the state. Likewise, the Cuban Internet is among the most 
tightly controlled in the world, while Internet access in North Korea is only permitted with 
special authorisation and primarily used for government purposes.  
 
In Turkey, on 20 March 2014 the Erdogan government imposed a block on Twitter after 
tweets began spreading linking the prime minister to a corruption scandal, only to be lifted a 
few days later thanks to a Turkish court order. Douglas Frantz, an American State 
Department official, likened the move to ‘21st-century book burning’ (see 
http://blogs.state.gov/stories/2014/03/21/21st-century-book-burning, accessed 28 March 
2014). The United States’ history on freedom of expression has not always lived up to the 
highest values, for post 9/11 brought about privacy and freedom concerns even in a country 
with a strong democratic tradition such as the US, as evidenced by the passing of the 2001 
Patriot Act which expanded law enforcement’s surveillance and investigative powers. In 
Europe, in the immediate aftermath of the British riots in August 2011, which resulted in 
widespread looting and property damage, British Prime Minister David Cameron partially 
blamed social media for the unrest, and raised the possibility of banning criminals from and 
otherwise censoring social networks.  
 
Corporate online activity and privacy concerns 
 
Fourth, the Internet has become a major arena for corporate activity, similarly to other 
brunches of the cultural industries. Individualisation of consumption has been accompanied 
by consolidation of media ownership producing global multimedia corporation intent on 
redeveloping cyberspace as retail real estate (Murdock 2004). Fuchs (2011a) argues that the 
Internet and social media are today stratified, non-participatory spaces, and an alternative, 
non-corporate Internet is required. Giant corporations colonise social media and dominate 
their attention economy. In a more recent work, Fuchs (2014) takes a step further and 
contends that big corporate (and to a lesser extent, political) actors dominate and therefore 
centralise the formation of speech, association, assembly, and opinion on social media.  
 
Liberal freedoms turn on capitalist social media into their opposite. The concept of 
social media participation is an ideology…it seems both necessary and feasible to 
theorize “Web 2.0” not as a participatory system, but by employing more negative, 
critical terms such as class, exploitation and surplus value (ibid: 102). 
 
Corporate social media gather data on users by continuously monitoring and recording online 
activities. Collected data are then stored, merged and analysed in order to create detailed user 
profiles containing information about personal interests and online behaviours. This, in turn, 
enables targeted advertising with the objective of luring consumers to buying products and 
services. The mechanism of targeted advertising on social media has been termed ‘panoptic 
sorting’ (see Gandy, 1993a, 1993b) as social media obtain an accurate picture of the interests 
and activities of their users. According to Fuchs (2014: 110) corporate social media sell the 
users’ data commodity to advertising clients at a price that is larger than the invested constant 
and variable capital. Fuchs (2013) argues in another work that social media ‘prosumers’ are 
double objects of commodification: they are commodities themselves and through this 
commodification their consciousness becomes, while online, permanently exposed to 
commodity logic in the form of advertisements.  
 
With the rise of user-generated content, free access social networking platforms, and 
other free access platforms that yield profit by online advertisement – a development 
subsumed under categories such as web 2.0, social software, and social networking 
sites – the web seems to come close to accumulation strategies employed by the 
capital on traditional mass media like TV or radio. The users who upload photos, and 
images, write wall posting and comments, send mail to their contacts, accumulate 
friends or browse other profiles on Facebook, constitute an audience commodity that 
is sold to advertisers. The difference between the audience commodity on traditional 
mass media and on the Internet is that, in the latter case, the users are also content 
producers; there is user-generated content, the users engage in permanent creative 
activity, communication, community building, and content-production (ibid). 
 
There is a big debate concerning the privacy of peoples’ correspondence when using online 
services such as email, text messaging and social media. Put it simply, people in the past 
created some content with the expectation that that content should remain private, but with 
the advent of social media this is now in the public space, with text messages and tweets. 
Once we are onto Facebook or Twitter we are basically telling everyone where we are, what 
we are doing, 24 hours a day. This social media world creates an environment of open 
distribution and as the technology is indeed pervasive and the amount of data we are creating 
very large, it makes it difficult to regulate. But do large social media sites take steps to 
protect user privacy? This is dealt with in Chapter 2. 
 
Absence of critical discussion 
 
Fifth, extensive dialogue and critical discussion (the very essence of the public sphere) is 
often absent on the Net. There seems to be a gap between ‘access to information’ and ‘ability 
to conversation and dialogue’ as meaningful debate is typically absent in social networking 
sites, which are dominated by trivial communication. In the case of the Twitter, for example, 
dialogue is limited by the very fact that it only allows the exchange of swift, short messages 
(up to 140 characters). This implies that there might be an increase in the number of active 
participants in the communication process, albeit leaving little space for substantive social 
and political dialogue involving groups and individuals. Shirky (2011) argues that ‘political 
freedom has to be accompanied by a civil society literate enough and densely connected 
enough to discuss the issues presented to the public’. He endorses the theory of sociologists 
Elihu Katz and Paul Lazarsfeld (1970) that the formation of well-considered political 
opinions is a two-step process. The first step requires access to information; the second, use 
of that information in conversation and debate. Under this framework, Shirky argues that 
social media sites have revolutionised how people form political opinions and have made 
information so widely accessible that more people than ever are able to develop considered 
points of view. 
 
Lastly, despite its increasing prominence as a place where people access news and advertisers 
spend money, the Internet remains a distribution medium, not a source of original news 
content. Although Internet companies invest in this medium, the investment has tended to be 
in technology and not in journalists. Internet sites unaffiliated with traditional media typically 
collect stories from various newspapers and wire services, or comment on the news, but do 
little original local news coverage or investigative reporting. So, is it just a myth that the 
Internet has the ability to contribute to democracy by creating a healthier public sphere? Is 
the creation of new social and political units by social media a cyber-fantasy? Not quite, as it 
was argued in a previous work (Iosifidis, 2011). If traditional media like newspapers helped 
to set up public spaces where people initiated forms of communication within nation-states, 
new social media can do likewise in the international space in which citizens increasingly 
invest their time to communicate with each other and create things. It all depends on how one 
uses the Internet and social media. As all new media technologies, the Internet and social 
media can provide a useful tool or the basis for a healthier democracy and an enhanced public 
space, but they cannot themselves create such a space. They can either be used as instrument 
of empowerment or domination.  
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has presented the theoretical framework of the book. It critically investigated the 
complex interaction between social media and contemporary democratic politics, and 
provided a grounded analysis of the emerging importance of social media in the public 
sphere, democracy and civic engagement. There is a widespread assumption that social media 
applications such as Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube are empowering people and making 
political processes more democratic, and yet the evidence is not always there to support such 
assertions. The literature review examined the salience of the network as a metaphor for 
understanding our social world, but also the centrality of the Internet in civic and political 
networks. As Loader and Mercea (2012: x) have argued, on one angle, there is often an 
assumption that the widespread use of the Internet for social networking, blogging, video-
sharing and tweeting has an elective affinity with participatory democracy’. On the other, 
they suggest that ‘such optimistic claims for the political benefit of social networking are in 
sharp contrast to much of the mainstream academic discourse surrounding the prospects for 
digital democratic governance’.  
 
The central question discussed here was whether the social media actually provide new forms 
of participatory democracy and result in an enhanced public sphere. The chapter intentionally 
took a more circumspect and open-ended type of approach at present and offered a balanced 
view of both the sceptics and the optimists. The two sections of the book that will follow 
intend to test the concepts against the empirical material drawn from the global North 
(section one) and South (section two). While the first section will explore the relationship 
between online mobilisation and policy change in mature, liberal democracies, the second 
section will shift the focus from the Western world to non-Western, developing countries, as 
well as authoritarian regimes. 
 
 
                     
i
 Chapter four discusses in more detail whether the new communications techniques can overcome the 
perception of a democratic deficit that has affected modern politics and contends that Bang and Keane's 
approaches provide a partial analysis of the true worth of Internet politics. It demonstrates how Obama’s 2008 
Democratic Presidential campaign directly interacted with Everyday Makers through an innovative use of new 
information communication technologies. Similarly, it looks into how Keane’s ‘Monitory Democracy’ occurred 
in the UK 2010 General Election Prime Ministerial General Election Debates which brought a heightened level 
of consumer-led scrutiny to the election as they placed a focus on political leadership. 
 
ii
 A social network can be described as a set of actors (individuals, organizations, families, neighborhood, and so 
on) and relations that hold the actors together (maintain a tie) (Haythornthwaite, 2002). The study of social 
networks can be perceived as a disciplinary enquiry into patterning of relations between social actors. The core 
aspect of the study of social networks is that network structure and position have important behavioral, 
perceptual and attitudinal implications for the individuals and the social system (Emirbayer, 1997).   
 
iii
 This and other ‘-gate’ scandals show that even in an era when print and limited spectrum audio-visual media 
were much more closely aligned with political parties, investigative journalism exposed and brought into public 
scrutiny dirty political actions and controversies about secret power.  
 
iv
 Polish-British sociologist Zygmunt Bauman argued that late modernity (or ‘liquid modernity’ as he terms it) is 
marked by the global capitalist economies, the process of increasing privatisation of services, and by the 
information revolution. In his Liquid Modernity, Bauman (2000) investigates how we have moved away from a 
‘heavy’ and ‘solid’, hardware-focused modernity to a ‘light’ and ‘liquid’, software-based modernity.       
